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Book Review 
Making Sense of Desegregation and 
Affirmative Action 
FROM BROWN TO BAKKE-THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTE-
GRATION: 1954-1978. By J. Harvie Wilkinson III.t New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1979. Pp. ix, 368. $17.95. 
COUNTING BY RACE: EQUALITY FROM THE FOUNDING FATHERS TO 
BAKKE AND WEBER. By Terry Eastland:j: and William J. Ben-
nett.tt New York: Basic Books, 1979. Pp. x, 243. $10.95. 
Reviewed by William Van Alstyne* 
Mr. Wilkinson has clerked for Mr. Justice Powell, taught (and 
published) as an associate professor of law at the University of Vir-
ginia, and currently serves as editor of the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot. 
From Brown to Bakke, 1 his review of our tumultuous quarter-century 
of school integration, reflects these touch points of personal biography, 
both for better and for worse. 
"For better" in respect to a good and useful number of things. The 
title speaks accurately of the subject and Mr. Wilkinson's book estab-
lishes an independent claim for itself. His subject is not race relations 
at large. Neither is it still another assessment of "the Second Recon-
struction." Mr. Wilkinson does not draw within his discussion a review 
of Supreme Court developments in related areas of race relations and 
constitutional law during the past quarter-century, and he makes very 
little use of the proliferating Acts of Congress and acts of executive 
discretion during the same period. The book's focus is the Supreme 
Court and public school integration, and that focus is maintained 
sharply. The manner in which the principal decisions are illuminated 
t Editor, Virginian-Pilot, Norfolk, Virginia. 
:j: Editorial Page Editor, The Greensboro Record, Greensboro, North Carolina. 
tt Director, National Humanities Center, Research Triangle, North Carolina. 
• William R. Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University. B.A. 1955, University of South-
em California; LL.B. 1958, Stanford University. 
1. J. WiLKINSON, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE-THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRA-
TION: 1954-1978 (1979) [hereinafter cited as J. WiLKINSON]. 
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by the practical, legal, and political difficulties at each step of the way 
provides a very well-informed perspective that is both interesting and 
important. 
After a brief introduction of events from the original apartheid 
decision in Plessy v. Ferguson/ and of the graduate school decisions 
that marked its erosion between 1938 and 1950,3 Mr. Wilkinson reaches 
Brown v. Board of Education4 by page twenty-six. The ensuing chap-
ters move briskly through "Brown II,''5 the principal decisions of the 
early 1960s6 (pursuant to which very little desegregation occurred), and 
the stiffening of judicial attitude in 1968 that required prompt disman-
tling of racially dual school systems: "to come forward with a plan that 
promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now."1 
With solid attention to.the role of the federal district and circuit courts 
in the South during this period, Mr. Wilkinson also suitably develops 
the diverse interpretations of the original Brown decision, which first 
led the Fourth and the Fifth Circuits toward quite different courses of 
action-the Fourth Circuit originally requiring little beyond the dis-
continuance of compulsory state-directed school segregation in the 
Carolinas, Maryland, and Virginia, and the Fifth Circuit directing 
more aggressive court-ordered remedies to achieve a degree of school 
mtegration that might ordinarily have been expected but for previous 
and persistent state-orchestrated segregation.8 
With Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education9 in 
1971, the Supreme Court unanimously sustained as within the discre-
tion of a careful district judge the fashioning of a busing decree to se-
cure significant desegregation within a very large, formerly de jure 
segregated school district in a state well accustomed to using that very 
means over a long period of time to maintain and to entrench racial 
apartheid. Mr. Wilkinson appropriately recognizes Swann (as have 
others) as the apogee of Supreme Court resolve and involvement. 
After Swann, just as the Warren Court's reapportionment decisions had 
reached ultimate stopping places (lest they 'Overrun the constitutional 
2. 163 u.s. 537 (1896). 
3. Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 
U.S. 631 (1948); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 
u.s. 629 (1950). 
4. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
s: Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
6. Goss v. Board ofEduc., 373 U.S. 683 (1963); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 
(1964); Bradley v. School Bd., 382 U.S. 103 (1965) (per curiam). 
7. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (emphasis in original). 
8. Compare Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956), cer/. denied, 353 U.S. 910 
(1957), with United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966). 
9. 402 u.s. 1 (1971). 
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justifications that brought about the original decisions), the doctrinal 
barriers to further judicial innovation became more complex and for-
midable. The decisions after Swann are plainly marked by a sense of 
growing perplexity and dimming efficacy. Mr. Wilkinson notes them 
very well, neglecting neither the doctrinal problems, the demographic 
realities, nor the significant differences of judicial attitude on the Court 
that most probably arose from the several appointments made by Mr. 
Nixon following his campaign against the Court in 1968. 
The de jure foundations of the Southern desegregation cases were 
less reliable as one moved north and west, discoverable only piecemeal 
in the actual practices of particular school districts, rather than observ-
able in statutes. The attempt to provide school desegregation remedies 
that correspond to specific racial wrongs of school boards (as distinct 
from racial wrongs by realty boards or by other private or public enti-
ties) strained remedial powers and remedial legitimacy. The impact on 
race-related income differences affecting housing choices, the capacity 
of private families to secure resegregation by moving to nearby dis-
tricts, the attentuation of constitutional justification to mandate deseg-
regation across district lines (or across city or county lines), the 
disputable efficacy of directing tax fund expenditures for transporta-
tion (rather than, say, for improved or for superior close-by schools)-
all of these factors complicated the principal post-Swann cases. 10 
Sometimes undercut by Congress, infrequently assisted by the execu-
tive department, massively resisted North and South, and-most of 
all-stretched ever more thinly from the constitutional underpinnings 
of Brown itself, the limits of school integration and the Supreme Court 
are recapitulated with skillful, lawyerlike discussions and full presenta-
tion of the relevant facts. In brief, this book is commendable because it 
does what its title tells us it will do. In doing that task quite well, it 
fmds no duplication elsewhere in the enormous literature that other-
wise overlaps it. 
To be sure, virtually all of Mr. Wilkinson's writing is "bor-
rowed"-one may readily fmd some previously published source for 
nearly everything he offers us. But there is no fault in this, and the 
several hundred footnotes (inconveniently gathered in the back of the 
book) are faithful both in reporting the author's sources and in indicat-
ing the impressive variety of published works he has drawn upon. In 
essence, he has culled from a very bulky literature, reorganized much 
10. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977); Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Span-
gler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 
413 u.s. 189 (1973). 
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pertinent information to outfit a case law discussion that might other-
wise have suffered from professional parochialism, and produced a 
more streamlined product reflecting a superior understanding of his 
subject as a whole. Commendably, too, he is often at pains to give the 
strongest arguments on both sides of each major case and development; 
that some of the strongest arguments originate in a book by an Alexan-
der Bickel, or in an article by a Herbert Wechsler or a Charles Black 
(rather than in an original fancy of Mr. Wilkinson), is a credit to his 
own professionalism. This is, after all, not a new or unaddressed sub-
ject. That individuals who have personally read the cross-disciplinary 
literature related to Brown v. Board of Education during the past two 
decades may fmd few surprises here is quite beside the point. 
Despite its excellent qualities, however, From Brown to Bakke 
also poses a severe problem for the reader. Its substantive excellence is 
too often obscured by a jejune style. Mr. Wilkinson may have thought 
that a more straightforward exposition, unaccompanied by homilies 
and melodrama, would have been insufficiently interesting. If so, I 
think he was greatly mistaken. Rather, what is otherwise a straightfor-
ward book was compromised by a failure to keep the presentation lean 
and unadorned. 
From the outset, the author attempts to make more of things than 
a serious reader knows to be appropriate. Hyperbole is everywhere. 
Herbert Wechsler becomes "a high priest of academia." 11 Professor 
Wechsler does not merely raise serious questions about some unad-
dressed matters in the original Brown opinion; rather he is said to "ac-
cuse the Court . . . of original sin." 12 It was not merely notable that 
Thurgood Marshall argued the case; rather we are heavily informed 
that, in doing so, Marshall thereby signified to "his people" that 
"blacks in their own destiny would henceforth have a say." 13 The ap-
pearance of John Davis on the other side is likewise lyricized in Ho-
meric fashion: "Like a rock he stood for segregation," 14 and "[l]ike 
Robert E . .Eee, Davis went the path of ennobling defeat, a testament to 
the South's ability to recruit men of character and principle to its most 
woeful cause."15 The Brown decision was not only unusually spare for 
an opinion of such moment; rather, we are told that it possibly reflected 
"questionable means," 16 "untoward methods," 17 contained "the most 
II. J. WILKINSON 34. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 27. 
14. Id. at 26. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 39. 
17. Id. 
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inflammatory English ever in fme print,"18 and failed "to lift the nation 
to the magnificence of the principle that it had that day redeemed." 19 
While the author castigates the unanimity of Brown because the Jus-
tices avoided separate concurrences or dissents (which Mr. Wilkinson 
inaccurately declares broke with "the Court's most hallowed tradition: 
that of open and spirited dissent"20), ironically he rebukes Bakke21 for 
precisely the opposite alleged defect, ie., such an array of differing 
opinions (six in all) that we are told it was in fact "a brokered judg-
ment."22 Occasionally saying more than his footnotes or sources will 
support, Mr. Wilkinson volunteers his view that "[t]he Court's own task 
in Bakke was to avoid a conclusive outcome,"23 a suggestion that will 
lift the spirits of lay cynics (but is quite the opposite of my impression 
from correspondence with two of the Justices, namely, that there was 
very genuine regret over the Justices' inability to reach accord in the 
case). Not wholly above the "defense" that injures, moreover, he writes 
of the pivotal opinion in Bakke by Mr. Justice Powell (for whom he 
once clerked): "[T]o call Powell's approach dissembling is not quite 
fair."24 
These and other unsuccessful flights of rhetoric and gratuitous 
description produce an overall schizophrenia in this book. A great 
number of people are deeply interested in responsible factual accounts 
of the judiciary's involvement in school desegregation. In the main, 
when Mr. Wilkinson stuck to that task, drawing very competently from 
a great deal of the intelligent literature which illuminates that involve-
ment, he did very well indeed; the middle chapters are solid, compact 
descriptions of highly complicated events fully worth one's time and 
interest. It is in his attempts at punditry, and in his ambition to make 
the book a piece of Southern literature as well, that Mr. Wilkinson does 
not do well, turning bad and even embarrassing at times. There is a 
suggestion that Mr. Wilkinson teetered between trades as an academic 
and as a journalist. He is very good as an academic, judging by the 
central portions of this book (as well as previous articles in a number of 
law reviews25). We should look forward to his return. 
18. /d.at31. 
19. /d. at 29. 
20. /d. at 30. 
21. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
22. J. WILKINSON 298. 
23. /d. 
24. /d. at 304. 
25. See, e.g., Wilkinson, The Supreme Court and Southern School Desegregation, 1955-197a· 
A History and Analysis, 64 VA. L. REv. 485 (1978); Wilkinson, Mr. Justice Powell· An Overview, 
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Counting by Race26 is a provocative complement to From Brown 
to Bakke; it takes up essentially where the other ends. Mr. Wilkinson's 
book is devoted to a critical review of the Supreme Court's indefatiga-
ble efforts to stop state and local governments from counting by race in 
ways that have been baneful to blacks-in directing where children 
shall attend school, where they are to fmd seats on buses, whom they 
may marry, and where they may eat. Eastland (a journalist) and Ben-
nett (Director of the National Humanities Center) direct their attention 
to the new instrumentalism of racial justice: counting by race to guar-
antee a minimum complement of government contracts, jobs, univer-
sity seats, promotions, visible offices of public power, and other 
concrete examples of success for blacks, Chicanos, Indians, and other 
minorities. 
The prematurity of announcing a "colorblind" Constitution has 
seemed self-evident to many observers. No case has ever held that race 
is a forbidden classification per se, no clear language (or "history") of 
the fourteenth amendment compels such a holding, and the sudden dis-
covery of such a rule by a (predominantly white) Supreme Court might 
well appear to carry implications of (white) majoritarian double-deal-
ing, self-servingly heedless of what past racial abuses have wrought. 
Eastland and Bennett also recall Lyndon Johnson's commencement ad-
dress at Howard University in 1965 as a very forceful statement of the 
case for mandating racial minority preferences: 
You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by 
chains and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a 
race and then say, "You are free to compete with all the others," 
and still justly believe that you have been completely fair. 
Thus, it is not enough just to open the gates of opportunity. 
All of our citizens must have the ability to walk through those 
gates. 
This is the next and more profound stage of the battle for 
civil rights. We seek not just freedom but opportunity-not just 
legal equity . . . not just equality as a right and a theory, but 
equality as a fact and as a resultY 
Indeed, the case for providing racial minority preferences in both 
the public and private sectors has seemed so compelling that in the 
recent Bakke case, not one of the more than sixty briefs urged a totally 
colorblind interpretation of the fourteenth amendment-and virtually 
11 RicH. L. REV. 259 (1977); Wilkinson & White, Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifestyles, 
62 CORNELL L. REV. 563 (1977). 
26. T. EASTLAND & W. BENNETT, COUNTING BY RACE: EQUALITY FROM THE FOUNDING 
FATHERS TO BAKKE AND WEBER {1979) [hereinafter cited as T. EASTLAND & W. BENNETT). 
27. Quoted in id. at 6 (emphasis added by Eastland & Bennett). 
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every "establishment" group filing as a friend of court urged the Court 
to sustain the constitutionality of separate and more permissive admis-
sion standards that provided sixteen percent more minority students (in 
addition to the fourteen percent who made it into the Davis Medical 
School pursuant to the regular admissions process). Among these 
groups were the American Bar Association, the Association of Ameri-
can Law Schools, and the American Association of University Profes-
sors. 
Eastland and Bennett are fully aware of these things, yet they are 
not exactly overwhehned by them. Thus, having labored over those 
three-score briefs, they suggest: 
The briefs in the Bakke q15e are full of efforts to distinguish be-
tween this "test" and that by which racial classifications are said 
to be valid or invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment; one 
reads of "rational relationship tests," "compelling interest tests," 
"intermediate balance tests," and yet others. It is possible to get 
lost in the sea of tests . . . .28 
And the authors are likewise warranted in noting that the consensus of 
compassionate opinion itself has not been entirely stable. Not only is it 
true that general polls (which produce consistent results both within 
minorities and in the population at large) disapprove the licitness of 
certifying individuals by racial tests for purposes of applying different 
standards of eligibility for employment, promotion, admission, or con-
tracts, but just three decades ago 187law professors urged as amicus in 
the same Supreme Court that "the Equal Protection Clause makes ra-
cial classifications unreasonable per se."29 Earlier still, moreover, just 
as some racial Reconstruction legislation specifically benefited blacks 
(as there was also some that disadvantaged them-such as that which 
segregated the public schools in the District of Columbia), there had 
been soundings in favor of a categorical imperative, altogether forbid-
ding government to use race as a basis for treating persons differently. 
The authors well remember Justice Harlan for his dissenting voice in 
Plessy: 
Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates 
classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights all citizens are 
equal before the law .... The law regards man as man, and 
takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil 
rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are in-
volved.30 
28. Id. at 20. 
29. Quoted in id. at 102. 
30. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), quoted in T. EAST-
LAND & W. BENNETT at 83. 
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As Eastland and Bennett recall, that position seemed very close to what 
Richard Cain, a black who represented North Carolina in the House, 
endorsed in 1875: "We do not want any discriminations. I do not ask 
any legislation for the colored people of this country that is not applied 
to the white people. All that we ask is equal laws, equal legislation, 
and equal rights throughout the length and breadth of this land."31 
And they recall too that Ale:J_Cander Bickel, scholarly exponent of judi-
cial conservatism, had presumed to derive from the Warren Court 
much the same thought. Thus, they quote Bickel from his last work: 
''The lesson of the great decisions of the Supreme Court and the lesson 
of contemporary history have been the same at least for a generation: 
discrimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral, and unconstitu-
tional, inherently wrong, and destructive of democratic society."32 
Eastland and Bennett leave no doubt of their own position and 
find within a variety of (separate and unequal) affirmative action ar-
rangements an inadvertent tendency to confirm racial stereotypes. The 
diversity the Davis plan produced, they note by way of example, was 
not a racial diversity among equals but a racial diversity among stu-
dents performing nationally within the ninetieth percentile of a test 
(which the medical school felt sufficiently reliable to count in signifi-
cant measure for all regular applicants), and racially different students 
within the thirtieth percentile of the same test. The diversity was thus 
not among racially diverse and educationally equivalent students but 
among educationally mismatched students.33 
Their point, written larger, is a disturbing one. An individual se-
lected by race to perform work that he or she may even assuredly be 
"qualified" to do-but according to the government's own usual stand-
ards, not as well qualified as another-may at once possess the emolu-
ments of "equality as a fact and as a result" (which President Johnson 
sought), but neither the respect nor credibility of that prescribed equal-
ity. Indeed, the risk may not be a trivial one that proliferation of such 
arrangements may itself operate to inculcate a renewed (and, alas, an 
empirically based) expectation by others that the race of an individual 
bespeaks a probability of on-the-job inferiority: that the race of the 
individual whom one confronts across a policeman's desk, a lathe, a 
shop counter, or an operating table evidences some uncertain degree of 
31. Quoted in T. EASTLAND & W. BENNETf, at 91. 
32. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975), quoted in T. EASTLAND & W. BEN-
NETT at 183. 
33. Eastland and Bennett discuss this point in Chapter 8 of Counting by Race, which is enti-
tled "Create in Him a Habit of Dependence" and subtitled ''The Case Against Numerical Equal-
ity." 
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lesser skill, troubling one's confidence and simultaneously stigmatizing 
all other persons of the same race holding equivalent positions, though 
few (if any) of those others may have achieved their statuses other than 
by a commendable combination of skill and work. The point is not one 
that can be brushed aside as a contrivance of hostility to affirmative 
action. It is at least as old as Hans Christian Anderson's fable of The 
Emperor's New Clothes.34 
One may earnestly respond that the degree and extent of race-des-
ignated minimum set-asides, quotas, or whatever may be superin-
tended to avoid severe mismatching, but the means to 
"constitutionalize" the limits of permissible differences are quite a dif-
ferent matter. Political processes clearly will not do it; what Phoenix 
may resist in ordering racial shares, Berkeley or Detroit may fmd alto-
gether right. What Minneapolis may think to be a sufficient additional 
"minority contractors" set-aside, the District of Columbia may elect to 
expand to twenty-five percent or more (and has, in fact, already done 
so). Moreover, insofar as one group succeeds in securing a racially des-
ignated share of fixed resources, the political pressure (and propriety) 
of other groups' "resegregating" by race as special race-propelled inter-
est groups, becomes heightened. It may, as Bickel suggested, yield a 
dis-integrative politics, racially reorganized political interest groups, 
thoroughly "destructive of democratic society." There may, indeed, be 
much wisdom in borrowing from the observation Mr. Justice Jackson 
offered in a related context: "It seems trite but necessary to say that 
. . . our Constitution was designed to avoid these ends by avoiding 
these beginnings."35 
The Eastland-Bennett essay on Counting by Race must not, how-
ever, be read in isolation. While thoughtful and highly readable, it is 
sufficiently committed to expounding the unwisdom of societies that 
count by race that lawyers and laymen alike should want to read a 
good deal else as well. Two of the best of such readings doubtless in-
clude Thurgood Marshall's powerful partial concurrence in the Bakke 
case36 and Judge Hastie's address, "Affirmative Action in Vindicating 
Civil Rights.'m That both authors are black, that each is well over 
34. I once asked a colleague who is genuinely committed to race-preference varieties of af-
firmative action whether it would be a datum of indifference to know the race of a university 
clinic physician assigned to assist him. The response, a bit slow in coming, was that it would make 
no difference, assuming only that the physician were over the age of 35-no minority-race physi-
cian of such age was likely to have been an "affirmative action" doctor. 
35. West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943) (Jackson, J.). 
36. Regents of the Univ. of CaL v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,387-402 (1978) (Marshall, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). 
37. Hastie, Affirmative Action in Vindicating Civil Rights, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 502. 
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thirty-five (and plainly earned his way to the reputation he acquired in 
the law long before affirmative action was fashionable), and that both 
regard it as premature to read the Constitution even now as colorblind, 
may make their writings especially worth considering.38 
38. For my views on the topic, see Van Alstyne, Rites o/ Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, 
and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 775 (1979). 
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